Dalhousie Law Journal
Volume 34

Issue 1

Article 10

4-1-2011

Peter Aucoin, Mark D.Jarvis &Lori Turnbull, Democratizing the
Constitution: Reforming Responsible Government
Gregory Tardi
Institute of Parliamentary and Political Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj
Part of the Law and Politics Commons

Recommended Citation
Gregory Tardi, "Peter Aucoin, Mark D.Jarvis &Lori Turnbull, Democratizing the Constitution: Reforming
Responsible Government" (2011) 34:1 Dal LJ 259.

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

Book Review

Democratizing the Constitution: Reforming Responsible Government,
by Peter Aucoin, Mark D. Jarvis and Lori Turnbull, Toronto: Emond
Montgomery Publications, 2011, 208 pages.
In the aftermath of the Prorogation of Parliament on December 4,
2008, upon the advice of Prime Minister Stephen Harper to then Governor
General Michaelle Jean, a particular theme in Canadian literature about
governance has flourished. This theme is the influence ofconstitutionalism,
democracy and legitimacy on government and politics. In the view of
many scholars there is a serious imbalance between the executive branch
on one hand and the legislative branch on the other. The sense of imbalance
has generated proposals for changes to the practice of Westminster-style
parliamentary democracy in the service of democratic legitimacy.
ParliamentaryDemocracy in Crisis,' a collection of essays published
in early 2009, edited by Peter Russell, the godfather of Anglo-Canadian
political science, and Lorne Sossin, now dean of the Osgoode Hall Law
School in Toronto, was the first text focusing on these issues. Read in
the context of the day (after the 2008 prorogation) the book laid the
foundation for academic and critical response to what many perceived as
the illegitimate use of power by government. These authors asserted the
prorogation was a strong-arm tactic based on a misreading of, or worse,
willful blindness to, the traditional understanding of the Constitution, and
in particular, representative government. It is noteworthy that the foreword
to that seminal work was penned by the Rt. Hon. Adrienne Clarkson, who
was Governor General from 1999 to 2005.
In 2010, the Honourable Clarkson's husband, John Ralston Saul,
whom some characterize as Canada's leading public intellectual, published
a biography of the pre-Confederation Prime Minister Louis-Hippolyte
LaFontaine and his Upper Canadian Reform counterpart, Robert Baldwin.
Saul used that text to reinforce the message of these critics-the democratic
legitimacy camp:
Since that day in March 1848 the heart of Canadian democracy had been
lodged in the confidence of the House. We are not a fixed-term democracy
or a presidential democracy. Voters do not choose prime ministers; they
choose representatives. And the voters' muscle is expressed through the
right of their representatives to give their confidence to the government

1.
Peter Russell, ed, ParliamentaryDemocracy in Crisis (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2009).
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and to remove it. If the ability of the representatives to give or remove
their confidence is interfered with, we are no longer a democracy.2
Through these and other monographs, it has become clear that much
of the support for constitutionalism and law-based governing lies largely
with academics and intellectuals. It is this community that has critically
analyzed the developments resulting from the election of the majority
government in 2011 with its devastated opposition, and the impact of a
largely uninformed media. For a general audience, the best formulation
of the need for reinvigorated constitutionalism and legality is the 2010
book Harperland, by the Globe and Mail newspaper journalist Lawrence
Martin. For a more specialized readership the present book provides the
most thorough explanation and analysis.
A significant milestone along the path leading to the publication of
Democratizing the Constitution was a little publicized workshop held in
February 2010 at the David Asper Centre for Constitutional Rights of the
University of Toronto. A number of Canada's experts in parliamentary
government met to discuss "Adjusting to a New Era of Parliamentary
Government." Peter Aucoin, the most senior among the authors of this
book, was a participant. Five recommendations were adopted at the
workshop:
* where the outcome of an election is not clear, there should be
authoritative guidelines to determine the proper course of action;
* guidelines on caretaker governments should be made public;
* the Standing Orders of the House of Commons should be more
explicit on the subject of votes of non-confidence;
* the practices and norms of parliamentary life should be more
clearly elaborated; and
* there is a need for greater public consultation and engagement
regarding the role of conventions in parliamentary democracy.
The present book should be read in light of these recommendations.
The central claim in Democratizingthe Constitutionis that in Canada,
in contrast to other Westminster-type democracies, the executive branch is
too powerful vis-A-vis the legislative branch; thus responsible government
has become seriously distorted, and too much power is concentrated in
the prime ministership. The authors assert the country is heading in the
direction of an undemocratic and even authoritarian form of governance.

2.
John Ralston Saul, Louis-Hippolyte Lafontaine & Robert Baldwin (Toronto: Penguin Group
(Canada), 2010) at page 165.
3.
Lawrence Martin, Harperland(Toronto: Viking Press, 2010).
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They oppose this trend and propose a number of reforms to mitigate the
threat to Canadian democracy.
The complexity of this book mirrors the intricacy of the subject matter.
Democracy, the rule of law, responsible government, accountability and
equilibrium among branches of government cannot be isolated from each
other or dealt with separately. The most important of the principles is that
in a parliamentary democracy the government must be responsible to the
House of Commons, and not the other way around. This is the very point
made by Speaker Peter Milliken in his ruling of 27 April 2010, on the
Afghan detainees documents.4
What are the causes of the Canadian malaise Aucoin, Jarvis and
Turnbull perceive?
The first source of difficulty is that in our constitutional structure
too few of the funaamental rules are recorded, and they do not offer
effective constraints on the misuse of power. The unwritten nature of our
constitutional conventions generates uncertainty as to their application
even though they powerfully supplement the written Constitution. This
inadequacy renders the conventions increasingly impotent as devices
to ensure the use of public power in accordance with the precepts of
democracy and responsible government. The authors state: "In our view,
the Canadian conventions of responsible government are inadequate and
have become more so over time. Neither the governor general nor the
House of Commons can effectively constrain the Prime Minister from
abusing power." (57)
The authors argue that conventions ought to be in the formal text of the
written Constitution. In Canada, courts are the only authoritative source on
the meaning of a constitutional convention. However, the courts cannot
enforce them, nor offer remedies based on them, if they are not observed.
As rules of political consensus, rather than written law, conventions are
thus vulnerable to the interpretation of those in power. Thus, conventions
are left susceptible to the abuse of those in power.
Aucoin and his co-authors then go on to analyze the nature of the
interpretation given to conventions by those in power. Their crucial and
potentially most controversial line of argument is how they distinguish
between the use of power and the abuse of power. In that regard, the
authors point to the "good faith," or not, of the head of the government:

4.
See, e.g. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 40th Parl, 3rd
sess, no 34 (27 April 2010) at 1415 (Hon Peter Milliken).

262 The Dalhousie Law Journal
The democratic system works only when the prime minister is willing to
abide by the spirit and logic of responsible government and thus exercises
executive powers in good faith. When the prime minister acts otherwise,
the system becomes one of unrestrained prime ministerial power. (60-61)
This raises the fundamental question: what constitutes good faith?
The answer lies in the distinction between decision-making in the general
public interest versus that made in the more narrow interest of partisanship.
In order for the system of government to function according to its design,
that is democratically and for the benefit of the people at large, the prime
minister must be able to rise above political party considerations and
partisanship. While politics is an unavoidable although limited aspect of
government, partisanship cannot be the general guiding force of public
life. The prime minister must make constitutional decisions for the benefit
of the country, rather than for the interests of political allies, followers and
constituents.
The vital criteria of good faith holds true at all stages: in respect of
the convening of Parliament after an election; in regard to the formation
of the government and its initial search for the confidence of the House
of Commons; in the ongoing application of the confidence convention
throughout the life-span of a government; in the maintenance of equilibrium
between the executive and the legislative branches; in decisions on
prorogation; and, finally, in the dissolution of Parliament and the timing
of elections.
According to Democratizingthe Constitution,the Harper Government
has not acted in good faith, as the authors define this concept. This
observation is based on two grounds. The first is that while Mr. Harper was
in opposition, he argued for reforms that would democratize the system of
government then in place. Once in office, he either did not implement his
own earlier proposals or implemented reforms, but then undermined them.
The second is that in the authors' view, Prime Minister Harper has governed
in an overly partisan manner, and has concentrated and personalized the
levers of power.
The common view is that the Harper Government is particularly
sensitive to criticism, and it is important therefore to properly characterize
the tone of Democratizingthe Constitution. Its analysis of governance and
the interpretation of constitutional conventions is not synonymous with
opposition to any particular government. The book critiques the Harper
Government vigorously. However, it also does not spare a number of prior
governments. It takes a balanced view, emphasizing constitutionalism,
democracy and legitimacy and how these fundamental concepts have
evolved in Canada for almost two centuries. Indeed, in a democracy, this
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type of analysis should be welcomed as a contribution to the discussion of
the public interest.
The prime minister, according to the authors, interprets conventions
in a particular manner. His apparent preference is for American
presidentialism and the centralization of power for the sake of unfettered
unilateral action. Hence the authors examine the schools of thought that
do or do not support this preference. They contrast the classic view of
parliamentary democracy and the essentially populist alternative. The
authors offer a trenchant critique of the populist position. This leads them
to conclude that the argument which would allow a change of government
to result only from a general election, but not from a vote of confidence
in a new government between elections is at variance with the specifically
Canadian design of the system of responsible government. The 2008
prorogation elicits the following comment:
Beyond the political rhetoric intended to keep the Conservatives
in power, something else was evident in the reaction that followed
the events leading up to the 2008 prorogation, and not just from the
Conservatives. That reaction exposed the gaping holes of the Canadian
constitution: the absence of a few clear, firm, and binding rules guiding
the most fundamental aspects of the Canadian constitution has led
to a high level of disagreement on our constitutional conventions for
determining what the governor general should or should not decide and
under what conditions. (176)
The analysis of these issues raises a fundamental question in respect
of responsible government: whether, in a vote of confidence that arises
at the opening of a Parliament, following a general election, or later on
during the life of that Parliament, there is a presumption of confidence or
of non-confidence in a government? The authors do not directly address
this point, but the sense of the book is that each vote of confidence is
sui generis. Only our future constitutional practice will inform citizens.
What is clearly set out, however, is the pivotal role of the legislature in
a Westminster-style system of government. A conscientious reviewer
must emphasize the authors' contention that only the legislature has the
constitutional authority to constrain, check and control the government on
a continuous basis. (192)
Democratizingthe Constitution is also interesting because it includes
a comparative perspective. Canadian practice is contrasted with recent
developments in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.
Canada is depicted as the weak link in the Westminster chain, due to the.
lack of agreed rules, the flexibility which enables partisan advantage to
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triumph, the absence of constraints on the use of power combined with an
inattentive citizenry, and an inadequately knowledgeable media.
Rather than allow the reader to fall into constitutional despair at
this litany of problems, the authors conclude with several integrated
recommendations. The most fundamental of which are:
* Parliament be summoned within a maximum time-frame after an
election;
* there be a more robust requirement for fixed election dates;
* a system of voting be adopted so that confidence in the government
could be withdrawn only on an explicit non-confidence motion;
and
* prorogations require the consent of the House of Commons.
These changes could be achieved through formal constitutional
amendment or they could be articulated in a New Zealand-style Cabinet
Manual. In addition the authors propose related reforms of executive
power, of political parties, as well as of various other aspects of Canada's
political-legal system.
This is a far-reaching set of proposals indeed. Some observers would
merely lament for the nation. Aucoin, Jarvis and Turnbull have the
combination of courage and temerity to make serious proposals for its
modernization. Their book is the most analytical and comprehensive of the
treatments of the governance of Canada following the 2008 prorogation. It
is therefore essential reading for those who would understand the Canada
of today.
It is with great sadness that this reviewer must note, in conclusion,
that Democratizing the Constitution has turned out to be Peter Aucoin's
scholarly epitaph. He died a few weeks after he completed his contribution
to this book. It is now for others to continue his work in support of a more
democratic, and therefore a better Canada.
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